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Registered cybersecurity service provider

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The clinical attack surface
The clinical systems an attacker reaches before the record does
A hospital is not defended at a single perimeter. These are the ways in that matter, all of which pass through the same decision: what may be isolated while patients are being treated on it.
Four inputs — connected medical devices, clinical workstations, vendor remote access, and records and integrations — converging into a segmentation and clinical-aware monitoring control, producing continued care, protected devices and a protected patient record.
Connected medical devices
Infusion pumps, imaging and monitors that run software no one is allowed to patch on demand and that a clinician depends on in real time.
Clinical workstations
The terminals where notes are written and orders placed, shared across shifts and rarely off long enough to update cleanly.
Vendor remote access
Device makers and integrators who reach inside the estate to service equipment, each a path that outlives the visit if it is not closed.
Records and integrations
The patient record and the interfaces that feed it — lab, pharmacy, insurance — where the data is most concentrated and most valuable.
What we do
Segmentation and a clinical-aware watch
Devices and clinical zones separated so a compromise in one does not reach the rest, with monitoring that reads a stalled workstation as a patient waiting.
Care that continues
A contained incident that leaves the wards it did not reach still treating patients.
Devices kept safe
Equipment that cannot be patched is protected by what surrounds it rather than by a fix it cannot take.
The record protected
Patient data held where the strongest controls sit, not scattered across systems that never needed it.
The hardest decision in a hospital breach is not technical; it is which clinical system may go dark and which must stay up while it is cleaned around.
The wrong first instinct
Why a confidentiality-first playbook fails in a hospital
Most security programmes are built to protect data first, and in a hospital that instinct quietly puts the wrong thing at the top of the list. Patient records matter enormously, but a record that stays confidential while the theatre scheduling system is encrypted has not protected the patient whose surgery was cancelled. Ransomware in a hospital is dangerous less because it exposes data than because it takes clinical systems offline, and the harm is measured in delayed care, diverted ambulances and procedures that cannot proceed.
So we reorder the priorities to match the setting. Availability of the systems that carry care, and the safety of connected devices patients are attached to, sit alongside confidentiality rather than beneath it. That reordering is not a slogan; it decides concrete things — which systems get the strongest resilience, which segments are built so an infection cannot spread from an office laptop to an infusion pump, and what a response plan is actually allowed to switch off while a ward is full.
Across a patient pathway
Where security has to hold as a patient moves through care
Security in a hospital is not a wall around the building; it has to hold at each point a patient passes through, on the systems clinicians use at that point.
Admission and identity
The patient is registered and matched to a record that everything downstream depends on being correct.
Access to registration and identity systems is tightly held, because a wrong or altered match is a clinical safety event, not only a data one.
- Registration
- Patient record
Diagnostics and devices
Imaging and monitoring devices generate the readings a diagnosis rests on.
These devices sit in their own segments with monitored traffic, so a compromise cannot spread to them and their readings cannot be quietly tampered with.
- Imaging
- Monitors
- Segmentation
Treatment and orders
Medication and procedures are ordered and administered through the clinical systems in real time.
The ordering path is prioritised for availability and integrity, because a delay or an altered order here reaches the patient directly.
- Order entry
- Pharmacy
- Infusion
Discharge and the record
The episode closes and its full record is retained, shared and billed against.
The record and its integrations are where data concentrates, so the strongest confidentiality controls sit here rather than being spread thinly everywhere.
- Patient record
- Billing
- Interfaces
Our role
What we secure in a clinical estate and what stays clinical judgement
- 01
Segmentation that respects care
We separate devices and clinical zones so a compromise stays local, and we design it with the people who use the equipment, because a segment that blocks a clinician mid-procedure will be worked around within a day.
- 02
Devices protected from the outside in
Where a device cannot be patched, we protect it with what surrounds it — controlled access, monitored traffic, isolation from the general network — and we work with the manufacturer rather than modifying equipment we are not permitted to touch.
- 03
A response plan care can survive
We write the containment plan around clinical continuity, naming in advance which systems may be isolated during care and which must be cleaned around, so a decision made under pressure is one that was already thought through.
Whether a given clinical system may be taken offline in an incident is a clinical decision, made by the people accountable for patient safety; we build the segmentation, the monitoring and the plan so that when they make it, the technical work is ready to follow either way.
Common questions
What buyers ask
Can you secure medical devices we are not allowed to modify?+
Yes, and that constraint shapes the whole approach. Many medical devices run software the manufacturer certifies as a unit, so patching or changing them yourself can void support or clinical approval. We protect them from the outside instead: putting them in their own network segment, controlling exactly what can talk to them, monitoring that traffic for anything abnormal, and closing the remote-access paths their vendors use once a service session ends. Where a device genuinely needs an update, that goes through the manufacturer. The device does not become invulnerable, but a compromise elsewhere in the hospital can no longer reach it, which is the protection an unpatchable device can actually have.
What do we take offline first if ransomware hits during clinical hours?+
That is exactly the decision a response plan should already answer, rather than one improvised at 3am with a ward full of patients. The plan names, in advance and with clinical leadership, which systems may be isolated to stop the spread and which must stay running while they are cleaned around — because taking the wrong one offline can be as harmful as the ransomware. In general the priority is to isolate the infected segment and protect the systems care depends on most, so the containment shrinks the incident without shrinking the hospital's ability to treat. The value of deciding this beforehand is that the person making the call during the attack is following a plan, not guessing.
How do you protect patient data without slowing clinicians down?+
By concentrating the strongest controls where the data is, rather than adding friction everywhere. Clinicians abandon or work around security that stands between them and a patient, so a control that adds a step to every login on every ward tends to make the estate less safe, not more, as people find shortcuts. We put the heavy controls around the record and its integrations, where the data concentrates, and use approaches that fit clinical work — fast shared-workstation sign-in, access tied to role and context, monitoring that runs in the background rather than in the clinician's way. The aim is that the security a clinician actually encounters is light, while the protection around the data itself is not.
In this cluster
Next step
Map your clinical attack surface
A clinical estate assessment that maps the connected devices, the crown-jewel patient systems and the segmentation gaps, with a containment plan that names what may be taken offline during care.
