Techbanq

Cybersecurity · government

A citizen cannot take a public service to a competitor

A public body carries two obligations a private firm does not. It must meet the controls the National Cybersecurity Authority mandates for government systems, and it must keep serving citizens who have nowhere else to go if a service fails. That combination makes the availability of critical systems and the protection of citizen records a duty rather than a commercial trade-off, and it decides which systems are treated as critical and how tightly change is allowed to touch them.

Serving Saudi Arabia from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi

Market
Saudi Arabia
Written for
CISO, CIO
Decision
Meet mandated controls while keeping a public service running

Cybersecurity credentials

  • National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi Arabia

    NCA registration

    Registered cybersecurity service provider

  • ISO

    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 certified

Certifications & registrations

The two obligations

The two obligations that make a public estate different

We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia

We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.

A private company chooses its own security posture and answers mainly to itself and its customers. A public body does neither. It answers to the National Cybersecurity Authority, whose controls for government systems are not advice but a floor it is required to meet, and it answers to citizens who cannot decide to bank, register or seek a permit somewhere else if the service is down. Those two facts change the engagement from a commercial optimisation into a duty, and a duty is scoped differently: the question is not what level of risk is acceptable to the business, but what the mandate requires and what the public is owed.

The practical effect shows up in what gets treated as critical and how change is controlled. A system that issues a citizen benefit or holds a national record is not one you take offline casually for maintenance, nor one you allow a rushed change to touch, because the cost of getting it wrong lands on people who have no alternative and cannot opt out. So critical systems are identified deliberately, protected with the strongest controls, segmented so a problem in an ordinary office system cannot reach them, and changed only through a process that assumes the service must keep running throughout.

Controls to systems

Mapping mandated controls to the systems that actually carry them

A control framework is a list of requirements; a public estate is a set of specific systems. Most of the work is the mapping between them — turning a stated control into a concrete change on a named system, ranked by how critical that system is.

Governance and asset knowledge

We build the inventory and ownership map the controls assume you have, because you cannot protect or evidence a system nobody has recorded owning.

What it produces: A known estate that controls can be applied to and evidenced against.

Critical system protection

We identify the systems whose failure hurts citizens most and give them the strongest hardening and segmentation, rather than spreading effort evenly across everything.

What it produces: The systems people depend on defended first and defended hardest.

Identity and access

We tighten who can reach citizen data and critical systems, and record it, so access is a governed and reviewable thing rather than an accumulation of old permissions.

What it produces: Access to citizen records that can be proven, not just assumed.

Detection and evidence

We put monitoring and logging on the critical systems and retain it, so an incident can be seen, and so the evidence an assessment expects exists before it is asked for.

What it produces: An incident that is seen, and a review that is answered from records.

Gap to evidence

How we take a public body from a control gap to defensible evidence

Readiness is not a single audit; it is a sequence that turns a set of required controls into changes made on real systems and the records that prove they were made. Each step produces something the next one needs.

STAGE 01

Assess against the controls honestly

We measure the estate against the mandated controls and report where it genuinely stands, including the gaps it is uncomfortable to name, because a flattering assessment fails at the real review. A true picture of where you stand against each control.

STAGE 02

Prioritise by criticality, not by ease

We rank the gaps by the harm their system's failure would do to citizens, so the scarce remediation effort goes to what matters most rather than to what is quickest to close. A remediation order the mission can defend.

STAGE 03

Remediate and implement

We close the gaps with concrete changes — segmentation, hardening, access, monitoring — made in a way that keeps the service running throughout, because a public system cannot go dark to be secured. Controls that are real on the systems, not just on paper.

STAGE 04

Produce and keep the evidence

We assemble the documentation a formal assessment expects and set it up to stay current, so the next review is answered from maintained records rather than reconstructed under deadline. Evidence an assessor can follow, kept ready between reviews.

Our role

What we implement for a public estate and what the authority decides

  1. 01

    Readiness and remediation

    We assess against the mandated controls, close the gaps and implement the protections on the real systems, so the estate meets the floor in substance rather than only claiming to.

  2. 02

    Evidence kept current

    We build and maintain the documentation a formal assessment expects, so a review is answered from records that were kept up to date rather than assembled under pressure the week before.

  3. 03

    Change that keeps the service up

    We make the changes in a way that assumes the public service must keep running, because a control implemented by an outage citizens depend on has solved one problem by creating another.

The formal assessment, and the recognition that a body meets the controls, belong to the National Cybersecurity Authority and the assessors it works through; we make you genuinely ready and prepare the evidence, and we never present that readiness as an approval only the authority can give.

Common questions

What buyers ask

Can you certify us against the National Cybersecurity Authority's controls?+

No, and any firm that says it can is misdescribing what it does. Recognition against the National Cybersecurity Authority's controls comes through the authority and the assessment channels it defines, not through a consultancy. What we do is make you genuinely ready for that: measure you honestly against the controls, close the gaps on the actual systems, and prepare the evidence an assessment will ask to see. The distinction matters practically, not just legally — a body that was told it was certified by its vendor, and then meets a real assessment, discovers the gap at the worst possible moment. We would rather you enter that assessment knowing exactly where you stand.

Which government systems count as critical, and who decides?+

Criticality is decided by the harm that failure would do, and the decision is the public body's to make, with our analysis to inform it. In practice a system is critical when its loss stops a service citizens depend on, exposes a national or personal record, or would take a long time to restore — a benefits payment system, an identity register, a system other agencies rely on. We help by mapping the estate and tracing what each system carries and what depends on it, which usually reveals a few systems whose failure is unacceptable and a long tail that matters far less. Naming those deliberately is what lets scarce protection and the strictest change control go where they do the most good, rather than being spread until they protect nothing well.

How do we secure citizen data held across several agencies?+

The hard part of data shared across agencies is that no single body fully controls it, so a weakness anywhere in the chain exposes the whole record. We approach it by governing the connections rather than assuming each agency has secured its own end: knowing exactly which systems exchange citizen data, controlling and monitoring those interfaces, and making sure a record is protected consistently wherever it travels rather than well in one agency and loosely in the next. Where data is duplicated across agencies for convenience, we look at whether it needs to be, because a copy held somewhere it is not needed is exposure with no benefit. The goal is that citizen data is defended to the same standard along its whole path, not just at the agency that happens to own the strongest controls.

Next step

Assess against the mandated controls

An assessment of a public estate against the mandated controls, ranked by system criticality, that ends with a remediation plan and an evidence trail rather than a red-amber-green chart with no owner.