Techbanq

Cybersecurity · financial services

A bank's hardest problem is proving the transaction was genuine

A financial institution is attacked less to steal its data than to move its money, so the security that matters most is the kind that proves a transaction was authorised, executed once and by the right party. Meeting the Saudi Central Bank's expectations is part of that, but readiness is a programme you run rather than a certificate we hand you — and fraud adapts faster than any control set written down, which is why detection has to keep learning.

Serving Saudi Arabia from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi

Market
Saudi Arabia
Written for
CISO, CIO
Decision
Secure the payment path and meet a financial regulator's expectations
Languages
EN · AR

Cybersecurity credentials

  • National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi Arabia

    NCA registration

    Registered cybersecurity service provider

  • ISO

    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 certified

Certifications & registrations

What a regulator expects to see

The controls a financial regulator expects you to be able to show

A financial supervisor does not ask whether you feel secure; it asks you to demonstrate specific controls. These are the ones that carry the most weight, mapped to what each is really protecting.

Strong authentication on the money path

We put layered authentication and step-up checks where value moves, so a stolen password alone cannot authorise a transfer.

What it protects: A transaction that a compromised credential cannot complete on its own.

Integrity and single execution

We design the path so a transfer cannot be altered in flight or replayed, with reconciliation that would surface a duplicated or changed instruction.

What it protects: Money that moves once, as instructed, and can be proven to have done so.

Real-time fraud monitoring

We score transactions against behaviour as they happen and hold the ones that do not fit, rather than discovering the loss in a report the next day.

What it protects: A suspicious transfer stopped before it settles, not refunded after.

Third-party and API exposure

We govern the connections to processors, aggregators and open-banking partners, because a control on your own systems does not extend to an interface you opened to someone else.

What it protects: A partner integration that cannot become the bank's weakest door.

The moving target

Fraud is a security problem that adapts to your controls

Most security problems are static enough that a good control, once built, keeps working. Fraud is not one of them. The moment a rule blocks a pattern, the people running the fraud change the pattern — a different amount, a different time of day, a genuine customer's own device after their credentials were phished. A fraud programme built as a fixed set of rules is out of date the quarter after it ships, catching yesterday's scheme while today's runs straight through it.

So detection has to keep learning, and the harder distinction it has to make is not fraud against legitimate use but a real customer against an attacker who now holds that customer's password. That is why behaviour matters more than credentials: the way a genuine account holder moves, pays and logs in is far harder to steal than the password, and a system that scores that behaviour catches the takeover a correct password would have waved through. We build the detection to adapt and we keep it tuned, because a fraud model left alone becomes a fraud model the fraudsters have already solved.

The money path, drawn

How a fraudulent transfer is caught before it settles

A transfer is not a single event but a short sequence, and each step is a chance to catch what should not proceed. The escape hatch is a human review for the cases a score cannot decide alone.

A flow from a payment initiation, through authentication and signal collection, behavioural scoring, and a hold-or-step-up decision, to a settled transfer with an audit trail — with a branch sending undecidable cases to human review.

  1. 01

    Initiation

    A payment is requested, carrying the signals — device, location, timing, amount — that a score will read before it moves.

  2. 02

    Authentication and signals

    The party is verified and the request is checked against how this account normally behaves, not just against whether the password was right.

  3. 03

    Behavioural scoring

    The transaction is scored in real time, and one that departs from the account's pattern is flagged before it is allowed to continue.

  4. 04

    Hold or step up

    A risky transfer is held or challenged with a stronger check, so the customer confirms while the attacker cannot.

  5. 05

    Settle, with a trail

    A clean transfer settles and leaves a record that proves who authorised it and that it executed once.

Always available

To a human review

The cases a score cannot resolve — high value, unusual but plausible — go to a person rather than being auto-approved or auto-blocked, because both errors cost, and a genuine customer wrongly stopped is a cost too.

Our role

What we build into the payment path and where your compliance team leads

  1. 01

    Controls on the value flow

    We build the authentication, integrity and reconciliation controls around the path money actually takes, so a transaction is provably authorised and executed once — the properties an examiner and a customer both rely on.

  2. 02

    Fraud detection that adapts

    We design and keep tuning the behavioural scoring that separates a real customer from an attacker holding their credentials, because a model that stops learning is one the fraudsters have already moved past.

  3. 03

    Readiness, not a stamp

    We assess you against a financial regulator's framework, close the gaps and assemble the evidence an examiner asks for; the supervisory relationship, the filings and the accountability remain entirely yours.

The regulatory relationship, the reporting and the accountability for it stay with your institution; we make the payment path defensible and the fraud detection sharp, and we prepare the evidence, but we do not stand between you and your supervisor.

Common questions

What buyers ask

Does this make us compliant with the Saudi Central Bank's requirements?+

It gets you ready and gives you the evidence, but compliance is a status your regulator recognises, not one a vendor confers. We assess you honestly against the framework's expectations, close the gaps we find, and assemble the documentation an examiner will ask to see — which is the substance of being compliant. What we cannot and do not do is describe ourselves as approved by the Saudi Central Bank or hand you a certificate on its behalf; no consultancy can. The supervisory relationship, the filings and the accountability stay with your institution. Framing the work as readiness rather than certification is the honest description, and it is also the one that survives contact with an actual examination.

How do you tell a real customer from an attacker who has their password?+

By watching behaviour rather than trusting the credential, because once a password is phished the credential proves nothing. A genuine account holder has a pattern that is expensive to fake: the devices they use, the times they transact, the amounts and beneficiaries that are normal for them, the way they move through the app. When a login is correct but the behaviour behind it is wrong — a new device, an unusual hour, a first-time large transfer to a fresh beneficiary — the transaction is scored as risky and challenged with a stronger check that the real customer can pass and the attacker usually cannot. No single signal is decisive; the strength is in combining them, and in keeping the model learning as the patterns of both customers and attackers shift.

Where does fraud detection sit — in the app, or behind it?+

Behind it, on the server side, and that placement is a security decision rather than an architectural preference. Detection that runs in the mobile app or the browser can be read, tampered with and bypassed by anyone who controls the device, so a determined attacker simply disables it. The scoring and the decision to hold or challenge a transaction have to happen in systems the customer's device cannot reach, where the logic is protected and the signals from many transactions can be combined. The app's job is to collect signals honestly and to present a challenge when the back end asks for one; the judgement itself lives where it cannot be switched off by the person being judged.

Next step

Review the payment path with us

A review of the payment path and its controls against transaction integrity, fraud exposure and a financial regulator's published expectations, ending with a prioritised gap list rather than a generic maturity score.