- Market
- Saudi Arabia
- Written for
- CISO
- Decision
- Test and improve how staff and process respond to deception
Information security for software delivery

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The path of a message
Following one phishing message from send to the moment someone reports it
The interesting measurement is not the click; it is everything after it. The report is the control the programme is built to strengthen, so it is timed as carefully as the click is counted.
The pretext is built
Nothing has happened yet; we work out what a message would need to look believable to your staff specifically.
A pretext drawn from public information and the real processes people follow, in the right language, rather than a generic template.
- OSINT
- Email infrastructure
The message arrives
It lands in inboxes during an ordinary working hour, indistinguishable from routine correspondence.
We record who opens, who clicks and who submits credentials — and, with equal weight, who reports it and when.
- Mail gateway
- Landing page
Someone acts on it
A click, a password entered, an attachment opened — or a report sent to the security team.
The click is captured without any payload; the report is timed, because the speed of the first report is the number that predicts a real outcome.
- Reporting channel
- SIEM
The round closes and the next is planned
Results are read as rates and times across the population, not as a list of names to circulate.
Findings feed the next round and the process fixes: a clearer reporting button, a verification step for payment changes, a training gap closed.
- Metrics
- Awareness programme
The ethic
Measuring people as a programme, not catching them in a gotcha
A phishing test designed to embarrass produces one number and a great deal of resentment. Staff learn that an email from their own security function might be a trap, which erodes exactly the trust the reporting channel depends on — and the reporting channel is the control that actually contains a real attack. So the programme is designed around improvement, not exposure: results are reported as aggregate rates, individuals are never named to their managers, and anyone who reports is treated as the success the exercise is trying to create.
Measured this way, the programme shows something a single test cannot: a trend. The first round establishes a baseline; each round after it should show more people reporting, reporting faster, and falling for fewer of the pretexts already seen. When the trend flattens, the finding is usually not about the people at all — it is a missing reporting button, a process that makes verification awkward, or a genuinely convincing pretext that needs a control rather than more training. That is the point at which awareness stops being a poster and becomes an operational metric.
What works here
The pretexts that work here, and why generic templates do not
The internal-process lure
A message that mimics a real workflow — a leave approval, a payroll update, a document waiting for signature — outperforms any prize or threat, because it matches something the recipient was already expecting to handle.
The authority pretext
A request that appears to come from a senior name, timed to a busy period when checking feels like an imposition, tests whether verification is a habit or a formality people skip under pressure.
Vendor and partner impersonation
An invoice or a login prompt appearing to come from a supplier the target genuinely uses is the pretext behind most payment-diversion fraud, and it tests the process around changing bank details, not just individual vigilance.
Language and local context
A message in the right language, referencing systems and institutions people here actually deal with, is what separates a test that teaches something from one staff dismiss on sight as obviously foreign.
Our role
What we run against your staff and what your awareness team keeps
- 01
We build believable, not cruel, pretexts
The scenarios are realistic enough to test the reporting reflex honestly, and agreed in advance to exclude anything that would distress rather than teach — no fake redundancies, no fake bereavements, no exploitation of personal fear.
- 02
We report trends, never a wall of names
Results reach you as aggregate reporting rates and response times across rounds; individuals are not identified to their managers, because the purpose is a stronger control, not a disciplinary list.
- 03
Your team owns the awareness programme
We supply the measurement and the pretexts that reveal the gaps; the ongoing training, the reporting channel and the culture that rewards reporting are your team's to run, and the programme works because they own it.
How results are communicated internally, and how the organisation responds to them, are yours to decide; we keep the testing ethical and the measurement honest, so what you carry forward is a rising reporting rate rather than a demoralised workforce and a number nobody trusts.
Common questions
What buyers ask
Won't a phishing test just damage trust with our staff?+
It will if it is designed to embarrass, and it will not if it is designed to improve. The damage comes from cruel pretexts and from naming individuals, which teach people that their own security team is a threat. We exclude scenarios that exploit personal fear, report results only as aggregate trends, and treat everyone who reports a message as the outcome we are trying to produce. Done that way, the programme builds trust in the reporting channel rather than eroding it, because staff learn that reporting is welcomed and that the exercise is on their side.
Do you report the names of people who clicked?+
Not to managers, and not as a list. Individual data exists during the exercise so that follow-up training can be offered, but what reaches leadership is aggregate: the click rate, the reporting rate, the time to first report, and how each is moving between rounds. Naming individuals turns the programme into a disciplinary tool, which suppresses reporting — people who fear being singled out stop reporting their own mistakes, and a mistake that is hidden is far more dangerous than one that is reported. If you want targeted training for those who struggle, we can support that without publishing a wall of names.
How often should a phishing programme run?+
Often enough to build a reflex and produce a trend, which usually means several rounds a year rather than a single annual test. One test a year gives you a snapshot and no direction of travel; regular, varied rounds let reporting become a habit and let you see whether awareness is genuinely improving or whether a particular pretext keeps working. The variation matters as much as the frequency — repeating the same template only trains people to spot that template, so each round changes the pretext, the channel and the timing to keep measuring the reflex rather than the memory.
In this cluster
Next step
Scope a phishing programme
A phishing programme run over several rounds with agreed rules of engagement, reported as reporting rates and response times that improve, and tied to the process fixes each round reveals.
