The premise
The day encryption starts spreading is a test of decisions made months earlier
We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia
We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.
When ransomware runs, there is no time to build a defence; there is only what was already in place. Whether the organisation is back on its feet in a day or in three weeks is decided before the attack, by three things that are rarely tested until they fail: whether the backups can be restored quickly and were themselves out of the attacker's reach, whether the network segmentation stops encryption at a boundary or lets it run through everything, and whether anyone has rehearsed the response so the first hour is action rather than confusion.
A readiness assessment does not ask whether you are secure — that question invites a comfortable answer. It assumes the intrusion succeeded and stress-tests those three things directly. The uncomfortable findings are ordinary: a backup job that reports success but has never been restored end to end, a backup server on the same domain as everything it protects, a response plan written two years ago with the phone number of someone who has left. These are cheap to fix in advance and catastrophic to discover during an incident.
What decides the outcome
The three things that decide whether an outage becomes a catastrophe
Prevention reduces how often you are hit. These three decide how much a hit costs, and they are what the assessment measures directly.
Backups that restore, and that the attacker cannot reach
Whether a full restore actually completes within the time the business assumes, and whether the backup system is isolated from the credentials that ransomware would capture.
What failure looks like: Backups that report success but restore too slowly, or that the attacker encrypts along with everything else.
Segmentation that limits the spread
How far encryption would travel from one infected machine before it meets a boundary it cannot cross.
What failure looks like: A flat network where a single foothold reaches every file server, workstation and database.
A response plan people have actually rehearsed
Whether the plan names real people and current contacts, and whether they have walked it through so the first hour is decisive rather than improvised.
What failure looks like: A document nobody has opened, with decisions no one is sure they are authorised to make.
How it runs
How a readiness assessment runs when the brief is "assume it lands"
Illustrative engagement
A mid-sized organisation with nightly backups, a documented response plan and a general belief that it is prepared, wanting to know whether that belief survives contact with a real ransomware scenario.
- 01A real restore is attempted from the backups, timed end to end, to establish how long recovery genuinely takes rather than how long it is assumed to take.
- 02Segmentation is tested from a representative workstation to map how far encryption would spread and where, if anywhere, it would be stopped.
- 03The response plan is walked through with the people it names, as a tabletop against a specific scenario, surfacing the decisions and contacts that are missing or out of date.
A tested restore time that is usually longer than assumed, a measured blast radius, and a response plan corrected against a real walk-through — with the fixes ordered by how much each shortens recovery. No claim that ransomware can no longer happen, because that is not a claim any assessment can honestly make.
Our role
What we pressure-test and what your recovery plan has to own
- 01
We test the recovery, not the antivirus
The assessment concentrates on what happens after prevention fails — restore, spread and response — because that is what decides the cost of the incident and it is the part least often exercised.
- 02
We make the exercise real, not theoretical
A restore is actually run and timed, segmentation is actually tested, and the plan is actually walked through, because a readiness claim that has never been exercised is exactly the claim that fails on the day.
- 03
Your organisation owns the plan and the decisions
Whether to pay, when to disclose, who speaks for the business and which systems come back first are yours; we make sure those decisions have owners and current contacts before an incident forces them at speed.
The commercial and legal decisions a ransomware incident forces — disclosure, whether to engage law enforcement, recovery priority across the business — stay with you and your advisers; we establish, in advance and with evidence, whether the technical means to act on them actually work.
Common questions
What buyers ask
Does a ransomware readiness assessment involve detonating real ransomware?+
No. We do not release live ransomware on your network — that would create the very incident the assessment exists to prevent. We test the factors that decide the outcome by safe means: a genuine restore from your backups timed end to end, a controlled test of how far a foothold can reach to establish blast radius, and a walk-through of the response plan with the people named in it. The point is to measure recovery, segmentation and response without causing damage, and every technique used is read-oriented or bounded and agreed in advance.
We back up nightly — why would we still need this?+
Because a backup that runs is not the same as a backup that restores. The recurring findings are a restore that reports success nightly but has never been tested end to end and turns out to take far longer than the business can tolerate, and a backup system that shares credentials or a domain with the environment it protects, so ransomware encrypts the backups along with the primary data. Nightly backups are necessary and not sufficient; the assessment establishes whether yours would actually get you back, and how quickly.
How does readiness testing differ from an ordinary penetration test?+
A penetration test looks for the ways in — how an attacker could gain a foothold. A readiness assessment assumes the foothold already exists and looks at what follows: how far it spreads, whether you can recover, and whether the response holds. They sit on opposite sides of the incident. A test reduces the chance of being hit; readiness reduces the cost when prevention eventually fails, which for ransomware it periodically will for almost everyone. Organisations that have run several penetration tests but never tested a restore are the most common, and the most exposed on the day.
In this cluster
Assume it lands — book the assessment
A readiness assessment that ends with a tested restore time, a measured blast radius, and a response plan that has been walked through by the people who would actually run it.
What happens next
- 1We reply within one business day.
- 2A 30-minute scoping call with a senior consultant.
- 3A written proposal with scope, team, and timeline.
Or reach us directly

