Information security for software delivery

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
What a portal is
A portal is a window into your systems, not a website in front of them
We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia
We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.
A brochure website presents content it holds itself. A portal is different in kind: almost everything it shows lives in a system behind it — an order in the ERP, an entitlement in a licensing system, a ticket in the service desk. The portal owns very little data of its own; its job is to reach into those systems on behalf of one authenticated person and assemble what they are allowed to see into a single screen. That is why a portal that stores its own copy of everything is usually a mistake in progress: it becomes a second source of truth that drifts from the first, and now two systems disagree about a customer's balance.
So the design questions that matter are not visual. They are: how does the portal know who this person is, once, without asking them to log into four systems; how does it decide what this particular partner or employee may act on; and how does it stay a thin, trusted window rather than quietly turning into a fifth system to maintain. Answer those and the screens follow. Skip them and you get a portal that looks finished and cannot be trusted with anything that matters.
Behind one request
What happens between a partner logging in and getting their answer
To the user it is four clicks. Underneath, each stage is a decision about identity, permission and which system to trust — and any of them, done loosely, is where a portal leaks data it should not.
Proving who they are
The partner signs in once and expects to reach everything they are entitled to without a second password.
Single sign-on federates their identity to the back-end systems, so one proven login stands in for accounts on several systems.
- Identity provider
- SSO
Deciding what they may see
They should see their own orders and their own contracts — never another partner's, even by guessing a URL.
Authorisation is checked at the system that holds the data, so a hidden button is not the only thing standing between a user and a record.
- Authorisation
- Systems of record
Assembling the answer
They ask one question — the status of an order — that only four systems together can answer.
The portal reads from each system in real time and composes one view, without keeping a stale copy that would soon disagree with the source.
- ERP
- Service desk
- Billing
Acting, and leaving a trace
They do more than look — they raise a request or update a detail, and that has to reach the right system.
The action is written back to the owning system and logged, so the portal is an accountable route into the estate, not a shortcut around its controls.
- Systems of record
- Audit log
Three portals, not one
Why a customer, a partner and an employee portal are not the same build
They share a foundation of identity and back-end access, but the audience changes the trust model, and copying one audience's portal for another is how sensitive data ends up one URL away from the wrong person.
The customer portal
Reaches the widest, least controlled audience, so it assumes the least trust: strict isolation between customers, minimal data exposed, and self-service kept to what a customer can safely do alone. The risk it manages is one customer seeing another's account.
The partner portal
Serves organisations, not individuals, so it needs a model of who within a partner may act, on which of the partner's dealings, and with what authority — delegation and roles matter here in a way they do not for a single consumer.
The employee portal
Sits inside your trust boundary and reaches deeper into internal systems, so its harder problem is not exposure but joining many internal tools into one place a member of staff can actually work from, tied to their existing corporate identity.
Our role
What we build over your back-ends and what those systems keep
- 01
Identity and access first
We settle how the portal proves who a user is and decides what they may do — enforced at the systems that hold the data — before the screens, because these are expensive and dangerous to bolt on after launch.
- 02
A thin, trusted surface
We build the portal to read from and write to your systems of record rather than to hoard its own copy, so it stays a window your data can be trusted through instead of a second version of the truth.
- 03
Your systems stay in charge
The back-ends remain the owners of their data and their rules; we do not move ownership into the portal, so retiring or replacing a back-end later changes a connection, not the meaning of your records.
Which audiences the portal serves and what each may do are your decisions to make and defend; we build the identity, the access enforcement and the composed surface that let a portal be trusted with real systems, and leave your back-ends as the owners of the data it shows.
Common questions
What buyers ask
Should a portal keep its own copy of data or read it from the systems behind it?+
Read it, in almost every case. The moment a portal keeps its own copy of an order or a balance, it becomes a second source of truth that will drift from the first, and then two systems disagree about the same customer with no rule for which is right. The portal should reach into the owning system in real time and show what it finds, holding as little of its own data as it can — typically only what is genuinely portal-specific, like a saved layout preference. Caching for speed is fine and different; keeping a permanent parallel record is the mistake, because it turns a thin window into a fifth system nobody agreed to maintain.
How do you give users one login across systems that each have their own accounts?+
Through single sign-on and identity federation, so one trusted identity provider vouches for the user and the back-end systems accept that vouching instead of asking for their own password. The user proves who they are once; behind the scenes each system is told, in a way it trusts, that this person is authenticated and what they are permitted. Where a legacy system cannot federate, we bridge it deliberately rather than storing a second set of credentials in the portal, because a portal that holds a shadow copy of everyone's passwords is a breach waiting for an occasion. The goal is one identity the whole estate agrees on, not one login screen hiding several.
Can one portal serve customers, partners and staff, or do we need separate ones?+
One platform underneath, distinct portals on top. The plumbing — identity, back-end access, the composed surface — is worth building once and sharing. But the three audiences sit in different trust boundaries: a customer is outside and least trusted, a partner is an outside organisation with its own internal roles, and an employee is inside your perimeter reaching deeper systems. Merging them into a single portal with a few hidden menus is how a customer ends up one misconfiguration away from an internal screen. We build a shared foundation and separate the audiences at the access layer, so each portal exposes exactly what its audience should reach and nothing that belongs to another.
In this cluster
Next step
Scope the portal
A scoping session that names who the portal serves, which back-ends it reads from, and how identity and access are proven, before any screen is designed.
