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ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The control set
Five controls that make a distributed team auditable
None of these is exotic, and none depends on where the team sits. What changes offshore is only that they must be written and checked rather than assumed.
Least privilege, with expiry
Each engineer reaches only the repositories and environments their current work needs, and every grant carries an expiry date instead of living forever.
The path it closes: A compromised or departing account touches a small, known surface.
No production data in development
Test environments run on masked or synthetic data; access to production records is a named exception with an owner, a reason and a time limit.
The path it closes: Customer records never sit on a development laptop anywhere.
Stated device and network expectations
Which machines may hold a clone of the code, disk encryption, screen locks, patching and what may not happen over public networks — written into the engagement, not assumed.
The path it closes: The endpoint stops being the unexamined weakest link.
Audit trails you can read
Who accessed what and when is logged in systems you hold, not in reports the vendor prepares about itself.
The path it closes: Questions from your auditor have answers you can produce yourselves.
Offboarding, same day
Accounts, keys, tokens and sessions are revoked the day an engineer leaves the engagement — contracted as an obligation, executed from one place, confirmed in writing.
The path it closes: Nobody who has left still holds a way in.
Regulated buyers
What a regulated buyer gets asked about its offshore vendor
If you answer to a financial regulator, operate critical infrastructure, or handle personal data under Saudi, Emirati or Qatari data-protection law, outsourcing does not move the accountability — you remain answerable for what your vendors can reach. The questions supervisors and auditors put to organisations about third parties converge, across frameworks, on the same short list: who can access which systems and data, where does the data physically live and travel, can you evidence access after the fact, and how quickly can access be terminated. Each maps directly onto one of the five controls above, which is not a coincidence — the control set is those questions, answered in advance.
The practical consequence for vendor selection: ask any prospective partner to describe, in writing, how it operates under each of the five, and prefer answers that reference your systems and your logs over answers that reference their internal policies. A vendor whose evidence lives in systems you hold can be audited without their cooperation; that property, more than any document they show you, is what your regulator's questions ultimately test. What this page deliberately does not do is interpret any framework's clauses — your compliance function and your regulator own that reading; the controls here are the qualitative ground those readings share.
The architecture
One controlled door into your systems, with a log behind it
Many engineers, devices and networks on one side; your systems on the other. Everything crosses through a single identity and access layer you own, which is what turns a crowd into an auditable population.
A surface diagram: vendor engineers, their devices and their networks converge into a single client-owned identity and access layer, producing attributable work, audit evidence and single-point revocation.
Vendor engineers
Named individual accounts, never shared logins.
Their devices
Meeting the written device expectations before access is granted.
Their networks
Reaching your systems only along the agreed, encrypted routes.
What we do
Your identity and access layer
Multi-factor authentication, scoped and expiring grants, and logging — administered by you, so granting and revoking never depends on the vendor.
Work, attributable
Every change traces to a named person.
Evidence, on demand
Access history produced from your own logs.
Revocation, in one place
One action ends everything a person could reach.
The design goal is that the vendor's cooperation is welcome but never required to answer who could reach what, or to end that reach.
Our role
We operate inside your controls rather than beside them
- 01
Your identity, accepted
Our engineers work under accounts you issue and can revoke, on the grants you scope — we do not ask you to trust an access system we administer about ourselves.
- 02
Masked data, standard
We build and test against masked or synthetic data as the default, and treat any production access as the named, time-limited exception your policies say it should be.
- 03
Offboarding, contracted
Same-day revocation on departure is an obligation in our engagement terms, with written confirmation to you — not a courtesy performed when remembered.
The control objectives, the risk appetite and the conversation with your regulator remain yours; our part is operating so that every answer you owe them can be produced from systems you hold.
Common questions
What buyers ask
How do offshore engineers test realistically without production data?+
With data that has production's shape but not its identities. Masking transforms real records so names, identifiers and account details are unrecognisable while formats, distributions and edge cases survive; synthetic generation builds records to the same schema from nothing. Between them they cover almost all development and testing honestly. The rare investigation that genuinely needs a real record — a bug that only reproduces against one account — is handled as an exception: a named person, a stated reason, a time limit and a log entry. If a vendor tells you their team simply needs a copy of the production database to work, what they are describing is a data breach with a schedule.
What device and network rules are reasonable to impose on a vendor?+
The same ones you would apply to your own staff handling the same material, written down and agreed rather than assumed. Reasonable: work happens on identified machines with disk encryption, screen locks and current patches; credentials live in a password manager, never in chat or files; access to your systems travels over the agreed encrypted routes; and code is not cloned onto personal devices outside the arrangement. Unreasonable, usually, is prescribing the vendor's internal brand of tooling when an equivalent control exists — name the outcome you require and let them evidence how they meet it. The test of seriousness is whether the vendor will put the expectations in the contract and accept spot verification, not whether their slide deck mentions security.
What actually happens on the day an offshore engineer leaves?+
A short, boring checklist executed from one place — which is the whole achievement. Their account in your identity layer is disabled, which ends repository, environment and tooling access in one action; active sessions and tokens are revoked rather than left to expire; any shared secrets they could have seen are rotated; their device's copy of the code is deleted and the deletion confirmed; and the offboarding is logged with a timestamp, with written confirmation to you the same day. The design work all happened earlier: because access ran through one controlled layer with named accounts, departure is an administrative act. Where offboarding is dramatic, the drama is evidence the access design was wrong all along.
In this cluster
Map the controls to your systems
A control set mapped to your actual systems — which repositories, environments and data stores each engineer role may reach, and how each grant expires.
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