Techbanq

NCA · requirements

Organised by domain, delivered by teams

The controls are grouped by subject. Your organisation is grouped by function. Most of the difficulty in a first reading is the translation between the two, so that is where this starts.

Cybersecurity credentials

  • National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi Arabia

    NCA ECC

    ECC compliance expertise

    NCA registration

    Registered cybersecurity service provider

  • ISO

    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 certified

Certifications & registrations

The cycle

From a control family to a programme that keeps running

Six stages, and the last one is what decides whether the second assessment is a review or a repeat of the first project.

  1. 01

    Control families

    Governance, asset management, identity, technical protection, logging, third parties, resilience — read from the published text, not a summary.

    • ECC
  2. 02

    Assessment

    Current state against each family, with an owner named per family, because a control nobody owns is a finding waiting to happen.

    • Gap register
  3. 03

    Gaps

    Sequenced by dependency rather than severity: the asset inventory comes first because most other controls are applied to a list.

    • CMDB
  4. 04

    Implementation

    Engineering and process change, delivered by us, across the estate the scope actually covers.

    • IAM
    • SIEM
    • Backup
  5. 05

    Evidence

    Produced by the control as it runs, not assembled the week before, and reviewed against the published wording.

    • Evidence pack
  6. 06

    Governance and review

    A cycle with dates and owners, so the next assessment reads a running programme rather than a project that ended.

    • Committee
    • Calendar

Applicability follows the Authority's own scoping rules and your assessor's reading of them; the programme above is what we deliver once that position is settled.

The domains

What each domain asks for, and who ends up owning it

The control text is authoritative and this is not a substitute for reading it. What it adds is the translation most first readings need: which part of your organisation will actually be asked for the evidence.

Governance

A cybersecurity strategy, a policy set that is approved and reviewed, defined roles, and risk management that produces decisions rather than a register.

Who is asked for the evidence: The executive that approves them, not the team that drafted them. Approval records are the evidence.

Asset management

An inventory that is complete, owned, classified and reconciled on a stated cadence.

Who is asked for the evidence: IT operations. This one gates most of the rest: a control applied to an incomplete list is incomplete.

Identity and access

Least privilege, multi-factor authentication on remote and privileged access, and periodic review with a record of it.

Who is asked for the evidence: IT, with the business owners who approve the access. The review record is the artefact, not the user list.

Technical protection

Network segregation, endpoint protection, hardening baselines, patch and vulnerability management, secure configuration.

Who is asked for the evidence: Infrastructure and security engineering. The largest domain and usually the best evidenced.

Logging, monitoring and incident response

Collection with a retention period, alerting that reaches someone, an incident register, and rehearsal.

Who is asked for the evidence: Security operations. An empty incident register reads as absent detection, not as an absence of incidents.

Third parties and cloud

Security terms in contracts, assessment of material suppliers, and cloud arrangements read against the Authority's cloud control set as well as the ECC.

Who is asked for the evidence: Procurement, with security. The domain most often owned by nobody in a first assessment.

Resilience

Continuity arrangements that include cyber scenarios, backups that are tested for restoration rather than for completion.

Who is asked for the evidence: Business continuity, with IT. A backup job that succeeded is not a restore that worked.

Reading it

Two things a first reading usually gets wrong

The first is treating the ECC as the whole requirement. The Authority publishes further control sets covering specific subjects, and where one of them applies it applies alongside the ECC rather than instead of it. An organisation running significant workloads in cloud that reads only the ECC has read part of its requirement.

The second is reading a control as a technology purchase. Most control text describes an outcome and the evidence that it holds, not a product. "Access is reviewed periodically" is met by a quarterly review with a signed record and no tool at all, and is not met by a tool that runs reviews nobody signs. Reading outcome-first is what keeps a compliance programme from becoming a procurement exercise.

Common misreadings

Four requirements that are narrower than they look

  1. 01

    "We need a SOC"

    The logging and monitoring domain asks for collection, retention, alerting that reaches a named person, and a record of action taken. Business-hours monitoring with a documented on-call rota meets that description for many organisations; the domain does not, by itself, require a staffed operations centre.

  2. 02

    "Everything has to be encrypted"

    Cryptography requirements are scoped by data classification, which is why the classification work comes first. An organisation that has not classified its data reads the requirement as universal, prices it accordingly, and is quoting for a programme the requirement did not ask for.

  3. 03

    "We need penetration testing on everything"

    The requirement is periodic testing of systems in scope, and scope follows criticality and exposure. Testing an internal system that has not changed in two years, annually, mostly re-buys the previous report. Ask your assessor what scope and cadence they accept before scoping the engagement.

  4. 04

    "The policies have to be ours"

    A policy adopted from a template is fine where it describes what the organisation actually does. What fails is a policy describing a process nobody runs — the gap is then between the policy and the practice, which is a worse finding than an absent policy and harder to close.

Our role

How we work a requirement map into a programme

Techbanq is registered with the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) as a cybersecurity service provider. Our work runs on your side of the assessment — reading the controls, closing what is open, and preparing what the assessor will ask to see.

  1. 01

    Reading the controls with you

    We work through the published control text and say where you stand against it, control by control, in the words the assessment will use.

  2. 02

    Closing the gaps

    We do the remediation work itself — the engineering, the process changes and the documentation — rather than handing over a list of findings for someone else to act on.

  3. 03

    Preparing the evidence

    We produce the artefacts the assessment looks for, generated by the control that runs rather than assembled the week before, and review them against the published text before anyone else reads them.

  4. 04

    Saying where you are already covered

    Where a control is already met we say so, so the budget goes to the ones that are not. It is the cheapest finding in the engagement and the one a supplier has least incentive to report.

The assessment itself is conducted by your assessor against the Authority's scoping rules, and we stay available through it — the evidence pack is written to be read by them.

The controls are published in full by the National Cybersecurity Authority. Work from that document rather than from a supplier's summary of it, and take applicability questions to the Authority or to your assessor. Source

Common questions

What buyers ask

How many controls are there?+

Enough that the count is the least useful thing about them, and the published document is the only place to get it right for the revision that applies to you. What matters more for planning: the domains are very unevenly weighted in effort. Governance and third-party management are small in text and large in elapsed time because they need decisions from people outside the security function. Technical protection is the reverse.

Do all the controls apply to us?+

Applicability follows the Authority's own scoping rules and your assessor's reading of them, and it is not something a supplier should settle for you in either direction. What we can do usefully is prepare the applicability position with its reasoning written down, so the conversation with the assessor is about a documented view rather than about an assumption discovered late.

Where should a first-time reader start?+

Asset management, because almost every other domain is scoped by it and a control applied to an incomplete inventory is incomplete by construction. Then classification, because the cryptography and access requirements are scoped by data sensitivity. Both are unglamorous, both are cheap relative to what follows, and both make the rest of the programme smaller and more accurate.

Map the domains to your own teams

A domain-by-domain read of where you stand, with an owner named against each family before any remediation is scoped.

Start the conversation