- Market
- Saudi Arabia
- Written for
- CISO, CTO
- Decision
- Bring a large connected-device estate under identity, isolation and lifecycle control
Cybersecurity credentials
NCA registration
Registered cybersecurity service provider

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The governing plane
Many device classes, one identity and policy plane
The fleets differ — cameras stream, sensors report, meters bill — but they converge on the same control plane, and that convergence is what makes ten thousand devices governable by a team of five.
Camera fleets, sensors, meters and gateways converge on an identity and policy plane, producing an isolated blast radius, a patchable fleet and a real inventory.
Camera fleets
High-bandwidth streams, exposed web interfaces, long service lives.
Sensors and telemetry
Constrained hardware, battery budgets, lightweight protocols.
Meters and actuators
Billing-grade data and physical effect, so integrity matters most.
Gateways and hubs
The aggregation points where one compromise reaches many devices.
What we do
Identity and policy plane
Every device individually enrolled with its own credential, assigned to a class, and granted only the network destinations its class requires — with firmware state tracked per unit.
Isolated blast radius
A compromised unit reaches its own segment, not the estate.
A fleet that can be patched
Known firmware per unit, staged rings, measurable coverage.
An estate with an inventory
What exists, where, on which firmware, answered from a record.
None of the outcomes requires exotic technology; all of them require the plane to exist before the fleet grows past counting.
Why fleets fail
The weakness that ships ten thousand times
Device fleets fail by multiplication. A server estate has variety — different builds, different owners, different exposure — so one flaw rarely opens everything. A device fleet is the opposite: procurement buys the same model in bulk, installation applies the same configuration, and whatever is weak in one unit is weak in all of them at once. A default credential nobody changed, a web interface nobody disabled, a firmware bug nobody can patch — each is a single decision that was effectively taken thousands of times. The largest botnets in history were assembled from exactly this arithmetic.
This is also why IoT security is not plant OT under another name. A plant defends a small number of fragile, consequential systems where the worst case is physical; a fleet defends an enormous number of cheap, replaceable units where the worst case is aggregation — thousands of footholds inside your network, or your cameras conscripted into someone else's attack. The plant answer is care per system. The fleet answer is discipline per class: decisions made once, enforced automatically across every unit, because nothing done by hand survives contact with ten thousand devices.
The lifecycle
A device's life, from purchase order to deliberate retirement
Most fleet risk is decided at the two ends of the lifecycle — what procurement buys, and what nobody remembers to switch off.
Procurement
A model is chosen, usually on price and features.
Security requirements enter the buying decision: unique credentials per unit, signed firmware, a stated support window, and a management interface that can be automated.
- Procurement policy
- Vendor assessment
Onboarding
Hundreds of units arrive and need to be live by a date.
Enrolment is automated: default credentials replaced with per-device ones, each unit registered in the inventory and placed in its class segment before it passes a single packet of production traffic.
- Certificate authority
- NAC
- Asset inventory
Operation
Years of quiet service, which is where drift accumulates.
Firmware rolls out in staged rings with a small canary group first; behaviour is monitored per class, so a camera that starts talking to anything but its video platform is an alert, not a mystery.
- Update service
- Network monitoring
- SIEM
Retirement
The vendor ends support, or the unit is replaced.
End-of-support dates are tracked in the inventory and trigger a plan — replace, or isolate harder — and a removed unit has its credentials revoked and its stored configuration wiped, so retirement is an event, not an absence.
- Asset inventory
- Certificate authority
Our role
Building the fleet controls and handing your team the console
- 01
The plane before the policies
We build the enrolment, inventory and segmentation machinery first, because a policy without the machinery to enforce it across thousands of units is a document, not a control.
- 02
The riskiest class first
The fleet is brought under control class by class, starting where exposure and consequence meet — typically the internet-reachable devices — so protection lands early rather than at the end of a long programme.
- 03
Run by your operations team
Onboarding a new batch, rolling a firmware ring and retiring a class become documented routines your team performs from the console we leave behind, with us on call rather than in the loop.
Which devices the business deploys, and what their data is worth, are your calls; we make sure every unit that joins the network arrives known, constrained and removable.
Common questions
What buyers ask
Is a separate network segment for every device class overkill?+
It is the cheapest control you will deploy relative to what it buys. Devices are the endpoints you can least harden — you cannot install an agent on a camera or a meter — so the network has to carry the defence the endpoint cannot. Segmenting by class is also operationally simple in a way per-device firewalling is not: a camera class needs to reach the video platform and the update service, and nothing else, and one policy states that for ten thousand cameras at once. The cost of leaving it flat is well documented: a compromised device on a flat network is a foothold beside your workstations rather than a nuisance inside its own segment.
How is firmware managed across thousands of devices from different vendors?+
By accepting that it will never be one tool, and building one process instead. Each vendor brings its own update mechanism, so the unifying layer is the inventory — which unit runs which version, and which versions carry known flaws — and the discipline of rings: a canary group takes any update first, a bad update stops there, and rollout proceeds class by class with coverage measured rather than assumed. The inventory also exposes the truthful, uncomfortable number: the proportion of the fleet that can no longer be updated at all, which is the input the isolation and replacement decisions actually need.
What do we do with devices whose vendor has stopped publishing updates?+
Treat them as permanently vulnerable and make the network carry that assumption. An unsupported device joins a quarantine class: the narrowest possible destinations, no management interface reachable from user networks, and monitoring tuned to notice any behaviour outside its narrow job. That is a containment posture, not a fix — no configuration makes an unpatchable flaw disappear — so each quarantined class also gets a replacement decision with a date, priced against the risk of keeping it. The deeper remedy is upstream: making the vendor's support window a procurement criterion, so the next fleet ages on a schedule you chose rather than one you discover.
In this cluster
Next step
Bring your fleet under control
A fleet review that returns your device classes, the shared credentials and firmware spread in each, and the isolation plan for the riskiest class first.
