- Market
- Saudi Arabia
- Written for
- CISO
- Decision
- Establish blast radius from an assumed initial compromise
Cybersecurity credentials
NCA registration
Registered cybersecurity service provider

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The question
Blast radius, not vulnerability count
We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia
We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.
An internal test is commissioned by someone who has accepted that initial access will eventually happen. The useful output is not a list of unpatched hosts — it is the answer to three questions: how far does one compromised workstation reach, how long does that take, and what would have to be true for it to be stopped.
The findings that shorten an attacker's path are rarely exotic. Service accounts with domain administrator rights and passwords that have not changed in years. Credentials in a deployment script on an open share. A backup system that can read every file server and authenticates with one key. Local administrator passwords identical across a fleet. None of these appears on a vulnerability scan, and each of them collapses a multi-week intrusion into an afternoon.
We also record what alerted. A test that reaches the objective without a single detection is a finding about the monitoring, and it is usually a more actionable one than the path itself — the path can be closed in a dozen places, but only if someone would see it being walked.
What we check
Six controls, and what failure looks like
Network segmentation
What a standard workstation can reach — servers, management VLANs, OT if present.
What failure means: A flat network means one phishing email reaches everything.
Credential hygiene
Shares, scripts, group policy, memory and scheduled tasks, for credentials in reachable places.
What failure means: One recovered service account can end the exercise in an hour.
Privilege separation
Whether administrative accounts are used on ordinary workstations, and whether tiering is enforced.
What failure means: Admin credentials on a user machine are admin credentials for the attacker.
Local administrator uniqueness
Whether the same local password works across the fleet.
What failure means: One machine compromised becomes every machine compromised.
Backup and management systems
What the backup, patching and monitoring agents can read and write, and how they authenticate.
What failure means: These systems reach everything by design; compromising one is equivalent to domain access.
Detection
Which stages generated an alert, which were logged without alerting, and which left no trace.
What failure means: A silent path is an incident that will be discovered by someone else.
How it runs
Four days from a desk, with the stopping point set first
The objective is agreed before the test starts, in terms specific enough to be judged: read a named file share, authenticate to a named system, reach a named database. "Domain administrator" is a weak objective — it is often reachable by a route that has nothing to do with what the organisation actually needs to protect.
1 · Objective and stop conditions
What counts as reaching the objective, which systems are excluded from active technique, who can halt the test, and what happens if we find evidence of a real intrusion already in progress. A written rules-of-engagement document both sides hold.
2 · The starting position
A standard workstation from your build, joined to the domain, with an ordinary user account and whatever endpoint controls the fleet runs. No exceptions made for us — the exceptions are what make the result meaningless. A test that reproduces the position an attacker actually occupies.
3 · Discovery and credential collection
What this account can enumerate, what the reachable shares contain, which scripts and policies carry secrets, and which service accounts are configured in ways that expose them. Read operations, largely. The credential and access map available from one ordinary desk.
4 · Movement to the objective, with a timeline
Each step recorded with the time it happened, so the report can be read against your monitoring logs afterwards. That comparison is usually the most valuable hour of the debrief. A dated path, and a list of the points where it could have been broken.
Scope boundary
How an internal test differs from a red team exercise
The two are sold interchangeably and answer different questions. Buying the wrong one is common and expensive, so the distinction is worth stating plainly.
What we do
- Test with your security team informed, so the exercise measures the controls rather than the reaction to a surprise.
- Cover the internal estate broadly, because the objective is a map of reachable paths rather than one path taken quietly.
- Record what alerted and what did not, at the time it happened, so detection can be assessed against a known timeline.
Where a test is commissioned to evidence a control rather than to inform engineering, the assessor decides which of the two this is and what the report must contain. The terms are used loosely across the market, so establish with them which one the control expects before the engagement is scoped.
Primary sourceCommon questions
What buyers ask
Should we do this before or after an external test?+
If you can only fund one, the internal test usually returns more, because most organisations have already hardened the perimeter and very few have segmented the inside. If you can fund both, run them in either order but read them together: an external finding matters far more when the internal test shows the host it lands on reaches everything, and far less when that host is isolated.
Do you need domain administrator access to run this?+
No — the opposite. We start with a standard workstation and an ordinary user account, because that is what an attacker starts with. Being handed elevated access would test whether we can use it, which nobody needs to know. Where a client wants both, we run the assumed-breach test first and a configuration review second, and keep the two findings sets separate.
Is there a risk of disruption?+
Lower than most people expect for the techniques that matter, because credential discovery and lateral movement are read operations. The risk sits in specific actions — password spraying against an account lockout policy, exploiting a service known to be fragile — and those are agreed in advance or excluded. Anything that could interrupt a production service is either scheduled or dropped, and the report says which.
In this cluster
Next step
Agree an assumed-breach objective
A scoped internal test with an agreed objective and a stated stop point. Findings ordered by how much they shorten the path, not by CVSS.
Agree an assumed-breach objective
What happens next
- 1We reply within one business day.
- 2A 30-minute scoping call with a senior consultant.
- 3A written proposal with scope, team, and timeline.
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