Information security for software delivery

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The lifecycle
What happens between a failing system and a closed incident
The workflow is short to describe and long to get right, because every step replaces something humans currently do by memory under stress.
The alert opens the incident
Monitoring feeds the tool directly: the incident record exists the moment the threshold is crossed, stamped with the service, the signal and the time — not fifteen minutes later when a human notices and re-types what the dashboard already knew. A timeline whose first entry is the truth, not a recollection.
Severity is read off a table, not negotiated
The definitions are written in terms of customer and business impact, decided in calm daylight, so at 3 a.m. the responder classifies by matching facts to a table instead of opening a debate about how bad this is. The same word meaning the same emergency to everyone.
The schedule pages the right person
On-call rotations and escalation policies live in the tool: if the first responder does not acknowledge within the window, the page moves up the chain automatically — no one’s response depends on who happens to be awake and watching chat. An escalation that runs on rules while people run on adrenaline.
The review is the exit, not an option
A significant incident cannot be closed without its review: what happened, what the timeline shows, and which actions — with owners and dates — will make the next occurrence smaller. The tool tracks those actions like any other work, because a review whose actions evaporate was a meeting, not a control. Incidents that make the system stronger instead of just older.
One queue
Why incident tool sprawl is worse than no tool at all
The typical estate did not choose sprawl; it accumulated it. The infrastructure team pages through one product, the application team opens tickets in another, a chat channel is where things actually get discussed, and management learns about outages from a spreadsheet compiled on Sundays. Each tool is individually defensible. Collectively they guarantee that during a real incident, the first ten minutes go to working out who knows what and where — and afterwards, no single timeline exists from which anyone could learn.
One queue of truth does not mean one tool for everything; it means one record per incident that every signal, action and decision attaches to, wherever people happen to be working. Chat remains where responders talk — integrated, so the record captures it. Monitoring remains where the signal originates — integrated, so the record opens from it. The consolidation that matters is of the record, and it is the precondition for everything else on this page: you cannot share severity language, run fair on-call, or review honestly across three partial versions of what happened.
What goes wrong
The four ways incident tooling quietly stops working
None of these announce themselves. Each one is discovered during the incident it made worse.
- 01
Severity inflation
When raising the level is how a team gets attention, everything becomes critical and the word stops carrying information. The cure is impact-based definitions and the discipline to downgrade in public.
- 02
Alert noise that trains people to ignore pages
A paging rule that fires nightly for nothing teaches every responder that pages are probably nothing. Integrating alerts is inseparable from pruning them: only what needs a human at this hour should wake one.
- 03
The hero rotation
When one engineer is the informal escalation path for everything, the schedule is fiction and the organisation is one resignation away from losing its incident response. Real rotations spread the load and document what the hero knows.
- 04
Reviews that produce documents instead of changes
A post-incident report nobody acts on is the most expensive kind of filing. Actions belong in the same tracker as ordinary work, with owners and dates, and the recurring incident is the metric that tells you whether reviews are real.
Our role
What we implement in the incident stack and what your responders own
- 01
The wiring that removes re-typing
We integrate your monitoring, chat and ticketing so alerts open incidents, updates flow to where people are watching, and resolution closes the loop — with deduplication so a cascading failure is one incident, not forty.
- 02
The framework, designed with the teams
Severity definitions, on-call schedules and escalation policies are drafted with the people who will be paged by them, because a framework imposed on responders is one they will route around by the second week.
- 03
The review habit, installed
We set up the review workflow inside the tool — templates, action tracking, the closure gate — and run the first cycles with your teams until the habit stands without us.
How your organisation defines impact, and what an acceptable response time is per severity, are operational decisions that stay with you; we build the system that executes those decisions at 3 a.m. without asking anyone to remember them.
Common questions
What buyers ask
How many severity levels should an incident framework have?+
Fewer than you are tempted to define — three or four levels that people can hold in their heads beats six that require the definitions document open during the outage. What matters more than the count is that each level is defined by observable impact — customers cannot transact, an internal function is degraded, no user-visible effect — and that each maps to a concrete response: who is paged, how fast acknowledgement must come, whether leadership is informed. A level that does not change anyone’s behaviour is a level you do not need. And the definitions should be revisited after real incidents, because the first version always misses cases reality supplies.
Can incident tooling connect to the monitoring and chat systems we already run?+
That connection is the point of the project, not an add-on to it. The serious incident platforms all expose integration surfaces for exactly this — receiving alerts from monitoring, posting into chat, syncing with ticket queues — and the work is less about whether a connector exists than about designing what flows through it: which alerts open incidents versus merely log, how duplicates from a cascading failure collapse into one record, and which updates deserve a notification versus a timeline entry. An incident tool wired to nothing is a form people fill in after the outage; the wiring is what turns it into the place the incident actually happens.
Should we build our own incident management system or adopt an existing platform?+
Adopt, in almost every case, and spend the build effort on the integrations and the workflow design instead. On-call scheduling, escalation chains, mobile paging and alert ingestion are solved problems, and rebuilding them buys you maintenance obligations without differentiation. The custom work that does pay is around the edges: connecting the platform to your specific monitoring estate, encoding your severity and review workflow, and building any bridge your regulated or air-gapped environments require. The honest exception is an organisation whose constraints genuinely rule out external platforms — and even then the design principles here apply; only the buyer of the software changes.
In this cluster
Next step
Design your incident workflow
A working session that maps your current incident path from first alert to closed review, and designs the single-queue workflow that replaces it.
