- Market
- Saudi Arabia
- Written for
- CISO, CIO
- Decision
- Find the weaknesses an existing identity estate has accumulated
- Languages
- EN · AR
Cybersecurity credentials
NCA registration
Registered cybersecurity service provider

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The reading
Five passes over the evidence an identity estate leaves about itself
The review works from exports and records, not interviews about intent — because the estate's history is more honest than anyone's memory of it.
Inventory the privilege that exists
Every account that can administer something — human, service, emergency — traced through direct grants, group nesting and role assignments to what it can actually touch. The effective picture routinely differs from the intended one. A privileged access register the estate has never had.
Find the dormant and the standing
Sign-in records crossed against the inventory surface the accounts nobody has used and the privileges held permanently that are exercised rarely — including the leaver who still authenticates and the migration admin from two years ago. A closure and downgrade list with evidence per line.
Measure MFA where it counts
Coverage is measured against sign-in reality, not policy: which accounts, protocols and paths still accept a password alone — legacy protocols, service consoles, the VPN — because attackers look for the uncovered path, not the average. An MFA gap map by account class and path.
Walk the federation trusts
Every trust the estate extends — to partners, acquired companies, SaaS tenants and its own past — is listed and questioned: who is on the other end now, what can arrive through it, and would anyone notice if it were abused. A trust register with an owner or a removal date per entry.
Order the fixes by blast radius
Each finding is ranked by what its abuse would reach — the dormant domain admin outranks a hundred stale ordinary accounts — so the plan spends the first month removing the widest exposure, not the longest list. A remediation plan any capable team can execute.
Assessment, not build
This review is a diagnosis; it does not sell you the surgery
Building an identity programme — connecting HR to the directory, automating the lifecycle, rolling out single sign-on — is a different engagement with a different shape, and organisations that need one usually know it. A review is for a different moment: the estate already exists, has run for years, and the honest question is what it has accumulated. Mergers left trusts behind; projects left admin accounts behind; growth left groups nested inside groups until nobody can say what membership grants. The review answers that question with evidence and hands you an ordered plan. What you do with the plan — fix it with your own team, with any supplier, or with us — is genuinely your choice, and the review is written so that all three work.
The reason blast radius orders the plan, rather than finding counts or severity labels, is that identity findings differ wildly in what they concede. A dormant account with domain-wide administration is a master key lying in the street; five hundred stale accounts with ordinary access are a housekeeping backlog. A plan that treats them as five hundred and one equal findings spends its energy where the numbers are, not where the risk is. Ordering by reach keeps the sequence honest: what would this weakness let an attacker touch, and how fast do we take that away.
The evidence
Four exports in, one ordered identity remediation plan out
The review runs on records the estate already produces. Nothing is installed, and production is never touched — which is why it can start within days.
Four evidence inputs — directory exports, sign-in and MFA records, privileged role membership, federation configuration — converge on a cross-examination that produces ranked findings, a closure list and a ninety-day remediation order.
Directory and account exports
Accounts, groups, nesting and role assignments as they stand.
Sign-in and MFA records
Who actually authenticates, from where, over which protocols, with which factors.
Privileged role membership
Admin roles across directory, cloud tenants and the platforms that matter.
Federation and trust configuration
Every external party the estate has agreed to believe.
What we do
The cross-examination
Each source is read against the others: granted against used, policy against sign-in reality, trust against a named owner — because the weaknesses live in the differences between the records, not in any one of them.
Findings ranked by reach
Each with its evidence attached, so it can be challenged.
A closure list for the dormant
Accounts and privileges with no recent use and no vouching owner.
A ninety-day remediation order
Widest blast radius first, executable by your team or any supplier.
The same review, re-run a year later, becomes the measure of whether the estate is accumulating weakness slower than it is shedding it.
Our role
What the reviewers establish and what your identity owners decide
- 01
Evidence, not impressions
Every finding carries the record that proves it — the sign-in that never happened, the grant with no ticket, the trust with no owner — so the report survives being argued with, which a useful report must.
- 02
Reach worked out per finding
For the findings that matter we trace what an attacker holding that account or trust could actually reach, because that tracing is what turns a list of issues into an order of work.
- 03
A plan written to be executed without us
Each remediation step names what changes, what might break and how to verify it landed — deliberately supplier-neutral, because a diagnosis that only its author can treat is a sales document.
Which accounts close, which privileges downgrade and which risks the business accepts are calls for your identity owners; the review makes each call a decision about evidence rather than a debate about recollections.
Common questions
What buyers ask
How is an IAM security review different from an IAM implementation project?+
They answer different questions at different moments. An implementation builds the machinery — lifecycle automation from HR events, single sign-on, privileged access workflows — and suits an estate whose processes are still manual. A review takes an estate where that machinery, or some of it, already exists and has been running for years, and asks what has accumulated underneath: dormant accounts, standing privilege, MFA gaps, trusts nobody owns. The output is also different — a review ends in evidence and an ordered remediation plan, not in new infrastructure. Many organisations run the review first precisely to find out whether they need an implementation programme at all, or three months of disciplined cleanup.
Why order identity findings by blast radius instead of by severity score?+
Because severity labels describe a category, and blast radius describes your estate. Two findings can share a label — "dormant privileged account" — while one administers a test environment and the other holds domain-wide rights that reach the payment systems. A generic score treats them alike; tracing what each could actually touch does not. Blast radius also makes the plan defensible to the people who must fund it: "closing these nine accounts removes paths to the systems that move money" is an argument a board can weigh, in a way that "we fixed 214 findings" never is. The count still gets dealt with — it is just not allowed to go first.
Can an identity estate be reviewed without disrupting the people signing in every day?+
Yes — the review is read-only by design. It works from exports and records the estate already produces: directory and account exports, sign-in and MFA logs, role membership, federation configuration. Nothing is installed, no credential is tested against a live system, and no user notices it happening. The one thing the review does need is access to those records, granted to a scoped, temporary, monitored account — and how an organisation handles that request is itself informative, in both directions. Disruption arrives only at the remediation stage, where it is managed deliberately: closures are announced, downgrades are staged, and the emergency re-grant path exists before the first account is touched.
In this cluster
Next step
Commission the review
A scoping call that lists which directories, cloud tenants and federations the review will read, and the evidence exports it needs — most reviews start within days of access being granted.
