Techbanq

Cybersecurity · email

Your domain is being used; DMARC decides by whom

Until DMARC reaches enforcement, anyone on the internet can send mail as your domain — to your customers, your suppliers and your own staff. Getting there without losing legitimate mail is careful engineering across every system that sends on your behalf, and it pairs with gateway tuning and a rehearsed compromise playbook, because prevention alone is not a plan.

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Cybersecurity credentials

  • National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi Arabia

    NCA registration

    Registered cybersecurity service provider

  • ISO

    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 certified

Certifications & registrations

The attack surface

Four ways email is attacked while a domain sits unprotected

Each of these needs a different control, which is why buying one product and declaring email solved keeps failing.

  1. 01

    Direct spoofing of your exact domain

    Mail sent as you, from infrastructure you have never seen, to customers who trust your name. This is the attack DMARC at enforcement ends — and the one that continues for as long as the policy stays at none.

  2. 02

    Lookalike domains a filter cannot own

    The extra letter, the swapped character, the different ending. DMARC does not reach domains you do not own, so this is fought with monitoring for newly registered lookalikes, takedown requests, and staff who check the sender before the request.

  3. 03

    Business email compromise from a genuine mailbox

    The most expensive variant: a real account — yours or a supplier's — is taken over, and the fraudulent invoice arrives from exactly where invoices always arrive. Authentication passes, filters pass; only process controls and out-of-band checks stand in the way.

  4. 04

    The gateway tuned by nobody

    A secure email gateway on factory settings passes what it should stop and quarantines what it should pass, and after enough lost legitimate mail the quarantine gets emptied automatically. Tuning against your real flow is what turns the appliance back into a control.

The rollout

Taking SPF, DKIM and DMARC to reject without losing a legitimate message

The danger in DMARC is not the enforcement; it is enforcing before every legitimate sender has been found. The stages exist to find them all first.

STAGE 01

Inventory every sender

Not just the mail platform — the CRM, the invoicing system, the marketing tool, the HR platform, the printer that emails scans. Each sends as your domain, and each one missed is legitimate mail lost at enforcement. A sender inventory with an owner for each source.

STAGE 02

Publish and watch at p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode changes nothing about delivery and starts the reports flowing — showing who is really sending as you, which legitimate sources fail alignment, and how much spoofing is already happening. Report data separating your senders from your impersonators.

STAGE 03

Align every legitimate source

SPF records corrected without breaching the lookup limit, DKIM signing enabled system by system, third-party senders configured or replaced. The slow, unglamorous middle of the project — and the part that decides whether enforcement is safe. Reports showing legitimate mail passing alignment.

STAGE 04

Tighten to quarantine, then reject

Enforcement arrives in steps — a percentage first, quarantine before reject — with the reports watched at each move so a missed sender surfaces as a quarantined message, not a lost one. At reject, direct spoofing of the domain stops working. A domain at enforcement, and reports that keep proving it.

When prevention fails

The business email compromise playbook is written before the wire moves

A BEC incident is a race with a bank transfer, and the playbook exists so nobody spends the first hour inventing a response. Ours are written around your actual finance processes and name the moves in order: the payment side first — freeze the transaction if it has not settled, call the bank's fraud line if it has, because recall windows are short and close fast. Then containment: the compromised mailbox's sessions revoked and password reset, the inbox rules attackers plant to hide their traces found and removed, and any other account that reused the credential checked. Then the evidence: the messages, the headers and the sign-in logs preserved before cleanup destroys them, because the bank, the insurer and possibly the authorities will ask.

The playbook's deeper value is the process change it forces before any incident: the rule that no supplier bank-detail change is actioned on email alone, but confirmed by a call to a number already on file. That one out-of-band check defeats the scenario that authentication and filtering cannot — the fraudulent request from a genuinely compromised supplier mailbox — and it costs a phone call. We rehearse the playbook with the finance team as a tabletop exercise, because the difference between a document and a capability is whether the people in it have run it once before it was real.

Our role

What we harden in your mail flow and what your people rehearse

  1. 01

    Authentication engineered to enforcement

    We run the sender inventory, the alignment work and the staged policy tightening, and we stay through the reject transition — because the last step is where an unfound sender surfaces.

  2. 02

    The gateway and the sign-in tightened together

    We tune the email gateway against your real traffic and move the accounts that approve money onto phishing-resistant authentication, because a filter and a stealable second factor is half a defence.

  3. 03

    A response your finance team has practised

    We write the BEC playbook around your payment processes, embed the out-of-band verification rule, and run the tabletop with the people who would live it.

Which senders are worth keeping, how strict the quarantine may be, and what your payment approval chain looks like are your decisions; we engineer the controls around them and leave reports that show they are holding.

Common questions

What buyers ask

Will moving DMARC to reject break our legitimate email?+

Only if enforcement arrives before the inventory is finished — which is exactly the mistake the staged rollout exists to prevent. The monitoring phase shows every source sending as your domain; the alignment phase fixes or replaces the legitimate ones; and the tightening happens in steps, quarantine before reject, with reports watched at each move so a missed sender shows up as a quarantined message rather than a silently lost one. Organisations that break their mail with DMARC are the ones that jumped to reject in a week. Done in order, the reject policy is an anticlimax: spoofing stops and nobody inside notices anything.

What should happen in the first hour of a business email compromise?+

Money first, mailbox second, evidence third. If a payment moved or is moving, the bank comes before anything technical: freeze what has not settled, invoke the fraud process on what has, because recall windows close fast. Then contain the mailbox — revoke its active sessions, reset the credential, and remove the forwarding and hiding rules attackers plant, or they keep reading even after the password changes. Then preserve the messages, headers and sign-in logs before cleanup destroys them; the bank and the insurer will ask. The reason a playbook matters is that this order is obvious afterwards and not at all obvious at the moment of discovery.

Do SPF, DKIM and DMARC stop phishing on their own?+

No — they stop one important class of it. At enforcement they end direct spoofing of your exact domain, which protects your customers, your suppliers and your staff from mail pretending to be you. They do nothing against lookalike domains you do not own, against phishing sent from other organisations' domains, or against a genuinely compromised mailbox whose mail authenticates perfectly. That is why the programme layers controls: authentication for the spoofing class, gateway tuning and phishing-resistant MFA for credential theft, and process rules with a rehearsed playbook for the compromise that arrives anyway. Anyone selling one of these as the whole answer is describing a gap as a strategy.

Check your domain posture with us

A domain posture review that reports where your SPF, DKIM and DMARC actually stand, which senders would break at enforcement, and the staged path to reject.

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