Cybersecurity credentials
NCA registration
Registered cybersecurity service provider

ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 certified
The shape of it
Three layers, and most confusion comes from mixing them
We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia
We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.
The first layer is national: the National Cybersecurity Authority sets the baseline controls that bind covered entities, and separately regulates the market of suppliers through registration and licensing. The second is sectoral — financial services, telecommunications, health and energy each carry additional requirements from their own regulator, and those sit on top of the national baseline rather than replacing it. The third is contractual: what a customer requires of you as a supplier, of which Saudi Aramco's contractor cybersecurity certificate is the most widely encountered example.
Confusing the layers produces two expensive errors. The first is treating a contractual requirement as a regulatory one and building a compliance programme around it, when the actual obligation is narrower and held by a specific counterparty. The second is the reverse — treating a regulatory obligation as negotiable because a customer has not asked about it. Establish which layer each of your requirements sits in before scoping any work, and get the answer from your own compliance function rather than from a supplier.
One consequence worth knowing early, because it affects procurement rather than compliance: the supplier market itself is regulated. Since 1 August 2022 entities providing cybersecurity services, solutions or products in the Kingdom have been required to register with the National Cybersecurity Authority, and managed security operations centre services carry a separate licence with defined tiers. This gives a Saudi buyer something buyers in most markets do not have — an authoritative way to check that a supplier is what it says it is, before any conversation.
Who governs what
The bodies whose published requirements matter
Each with a primary source. Whether a given requirement applies to your entity is determined by that body and your own compliance function — not by this page and not by a supplier.
National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA)
The national baseline. Publishes the Essential Cybersecurity Controls and further control sets, and is the competent authority for cybersecurity in the Kingdom.
What it means for you: If you are a covered entity, this is your floor. Establish your coverage status first — everything else is scoped against it.
NCA — provider registration and licensing
The supplier market. Registration through the Haseen portal has been a requirement since 1 August 2022; MSOC services carry a separate Tier 1 / Tier 2 licence.
What it means for you: A procurement check you can run yourself. Ask for status and verify it at the Authority rather than accepting a supplier claim.
Sector regulators
Additional requirements for financial services, telecommunications, health and energy, layered on the national baseline rather than replacing it.
What it means for you: Get the applicable set from your own regulator. Sector requirements are where scope most often turns out larger than assumed.
Saudi Aramco — contractor requirements
A contractual requirement on suppliers in its supply chain, not a national regulation. The certificate is issued through audit firms Aramco authorises.
What it means for you: Applies if you supply Aramco. No supplier can issue it or guarantee the outcome — readiness support and certification are different things.
International standards
ISO/IEC 27001 and related standards. Voluntary unless a contract or a regulator requires them, and certified through accredited certification bodies.
What it means for you: Useful where customers ask for it. Not a substitute for the national baseline and not issued by any consultancy.
The work itself
Six disciplines, and what each is actually for
These are frequently sold as interchangeable and are not. Confusing two of them is the most common reason a security budget produces less assurance than expected.
Assessment and testing
Periodic examination by someone trying to break the system. Produces findings, not protection. Its value depends almost entirely on the tester and on whether the scope included the authenticated paths where the real problems are.
Monitoring and response
Continuous detection and the capability to act on it. A different purchase from assessment, with a different economic shape, and in the Kingdom a licensed one when bought as a managed service.
Architecture and engineering
Building systems so the findings do not recur — identity, segmentation, secrets handling, secure defaults in the pipeline. The only discipline here that removes classes of problem rather than instances.
Compliance readiness
Producing the evidence an assessor will accept, in the form they accept it. Adjacent to security work and not identical to it — an organisation can be compliant and exposed, or secure and unable to prove it.
Operational technology security
Industrial control systems, where availability outranks confidentiality and an active scan can stop a process. A genuinely separate specialism, and the one most often attempted with IT methods by people who have not worked on a plant.
People and process
Access governance, joiner-mover-leaver, incident procedures that have been rehearsed, and awareness that changes behaviour rather than recording completion. The least technical and the most frequently the root cause.
Where to start
If you have just picked this up
In this order. Each step makes the next one answerable, and none of them requires a supplier.
Establish what applies to you
Coverage status under the national baseline, your sector regulator's additional set, and any contractual requirement from a major customer. From your compliance function and the regulators, in writing. A written list of applicable obligations with their source.
Find out what you actually have
An asset and identity inventory. Almost every subsequent question depends on it, and almost nobody's is current — the systems nobody remembers are the ones that appear in incidents. What exists, who owns it, and what it is exposed to.
Gap the obligations against reality
Control by control, with evidence rather than assertion. The output is a prioritised list, and the priority should be driven by exposure and by obligation, in that order. A gap register with an owner and a date against each entry.
Fix the exposure before the paperwork
Where the two conflict, remediate what is exposed first. An organisation that passes an assessment while carrying a public administrative interface has optimised for the wrong reviewer. A shorter exposure list and evidence produced as a by-product.
Then buy, and verify who you are buying from
By this point you can scope properly. Check registration and, for managed monitoring, licence status with the Authority before the commercial conversation rather than after it. A specification a supplier can quote against, and a verified shortlist.
Common questions
What buyers ask
How do we know whether the national controls apply to us?+
The Authority defines the scope of covered entities and publishes its documents; your compliance or legal function should establish your position against them, and where it is genuinely ambiguous the Authority is the body to ask. No supplier can determine your coverage status, and any supplier that offers to is selling you a scope rather than assessing one. Get the answer in writing before you commission work, because it determines everything downstream.
Is this page trying to sell us something?+
It is published by a company that sells cybersecurity services, so read it with that in mind. What it deliberately does not do is describe a problem and then present Techbanq as the answer — the sequence in the last section is one you can run entirely without us, and the verification step points at the regulator rather than at a supplier list. Where you want the detail on a specific area, the linked pages go further and are more commercial.
What is the single most common gap you see?+
Access that was granted and never removed. People who changed role three years ago and kept both sets of permissions, service accounts created for a migration that finished, contractor credentials still active, and administrative interfaces reachable from the public internet because that was convenient during a deployment. It is not sophisticated and it is what shows up in incidents. Joiner-mover-leaver discipline and an access review with a real owner produce more risk reduction per unit of effort than almost anything else available.
In this cluster
Next step
Review your NCA readiness
Nothing on this page is a pitch. If a section raises a question about your own position, the linked pages go deeper, and a readiness review is available when you want one.
