Techbanq

Cloud security · Saudi Arabia

Nobody exploited anything. Somebody granted it

The recurring cloud incident is not an exploited vulnerability. It is a role with a wildcard, a storage bucket opened for a migration and never closed, and a log that was not being collected when it mattered.

Serving Saudi Arabia from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi

Market
Saudi Arabia
Written for
CTO, CISO
Decision
Establish whether the cloud estate is configured safely

Information security for cloud delivery

  • ISO

    ISO/IEC 27001

    ISO/IEC 27001 certified

Certifications & registrations

What the review is

A reading exercise, not a probing exercise

We do not have an office in Saudi Arabia

We serve organisations there from our Riyadh office and our engineering hubs in Lahore and Karachi, travelling for the parts of an engagement that need to happen in person.

A cloud estate can be read. Identity policy, network rules, storage permissions and key configuration are all declared, and they can be examined directly rather than inferred by sending traffic at them. That makes a configuration review fundamentally different from a penetration test: it is complete over what it reads, where a test is complete only over what it reached.

The tooling that reads it is not the hard part. Every provider ships a posture dashboard and there are several good third-party ones, and any of them will return several hundred findings within an hour. The hard part is that almost all of those findings are true and almost none of them matter, and a report that hands over the export has moved the work rather than done it.

So the review sorts by reachability rather than by label. A public storage bucket holding a marketing asset is not an incident. A private bucket readable by a role that a public-facing container can assume is one, and no dashboard flags it because each half is configured correctly. Finding that path requires following the identity chain rather than checking a control list, and that is the work.

Where the findings are

Six areas, in the order they produce severity

01

Identity and privilege paths

Which roles exist, which principals can assume them, and where a chain of individually reasonable grants ends somewhere unreasonable. Wildcards in policy, roles that can modify their own permissions, and long-lived access keys belonging to people who left.

02

Network boundaries

What is genuinely reachable from the internet against what was intended to be, peering and transit that connects environments meant to be separate, and egress rules that permit anything outbound.

03

Data exposure

Storage, databases, snapshots and backups — with snapshots the recurring one, because a database is locked down and a snapshot of it is shared with an account nobody recognises.

04

Secrets and keys

Where credentials live, whether encryption keys are managed or default, who can decrypt with them, and whether a secret in an environment variable is visible to anyone who can describe the resource.

05

Logging and detection

Whether the audit trail is on in every region and account, whether it is writable by the accounts it records, and how long it is retained. A log an attacker can delete is not evidence.

06

Drift between code and estate

Where infrastructure is defined as code, what exists in the account that the code does not describe. Manual changes made during an incident and never reconciled are a reliable source of the resources nobody remembers.

Sequence

How the review runs

STAGE 01

1 · Read-only access

A read-only role in each account, subscription or project, scoped and time-limited, created by you and revoked at the end. Nothing we do changes state. A complete read of the estate, with no change window required.

STAGE 02

2 · Automated collection

The full configuration state pulled and normalised across providers. This part is fast and produces the several hundred findings that are not yet a report. A raw inventory and control state, handed over as well.

STAGE 03

3 · Path analysis

Following the identity chains: from each internet-facing resource, what can be assumed, and from there what can be read or written. This is the manual work and where the real findings emerge. A short list of reachable paths to data, each traced end to end.

STAGE 04

4 · Prioritised remediation

Findings ordered by reachability, each with the specific policy or rule to change. Where infrastructure is defined as code, the change is expressed against the code rather than the console. A remediation list an engineer can work through in order.

Scope boundary

What a configuration review establishes

What we do

  • Work read-only, so the review needs no change window and carries no risk to running services.
  • Rank findings by what a credential could actually reach, and say plainly which dashboard findings we set aside and why.
  • Hand over the raw collected state as well as the report, so the analysis can be repeated by your own team.

Where data residency obligations apply, which region a resource sits in and where its backups and logs are replicated are configuration facts a review can establish. What obligations apply to your data is a determination for your legal and compliance function, working from the regulator's own published rules.

Primary source

Common questions

What buyers ask

We already run a posture management tool. What does a review add?+

Prioritisation and path analysis. The tool tells you a control is not met on four hundred resources; it does not tell you that on three of them the gap connects an internet-facing service to a customer database through two role assumptions. It also cannot tell you which of its findings are irrelevant in your architecture, and working through four hundred alerts is how teams stop reading them at all.

Can you review a multi-cloud estate in one engagement?+

Yes, and the interesting findings are usually at the joins. The identity model differs enough between providers that a team fluent in one carries assumptions into the other, and the connections between estates — a peering link, a federated role, a shared secret store — are configured once during a migration and rarely revisited. Those joins get specific attention rather than being reviewed as two separate estates.

How often should this be repeated?+

Annually as a full review, and continuously as a control in the pipeline — the point of infrastructure as code is that most drift can be caught before it is deployed rather than found afterwards. Where an estate is changing quickly, a shorter review focused on identity alone at six months catches most of what accumulates, because privilege is the domain that grows quietly and never shrinks on its own.

Next step

Give us read-only access for a week

Read-only access to the estate for a fixed window, returning findings ordered by what an attacker holding one credential could reach.

Give us read-only access for a week

What happens next

  1. 1We reply within one business day.
  2. 2A 30-minute scoping call with a senior consultant.
  3. 3A written proposal with scope, team, and timeline.

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